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U.S. TAX TREATIES: TRENDS, ISSUES, &
POLICIES IN 2006 AND BEYOND
William P. Streng*
I. INTRODUCTION
AX lawyers regularly spend countless hours trying to parse the
often impenetrable language of Subchapter N in the Internal Rev-
enue Code ("I.R.C.") and the accompanying Treasury Regula-
tions, only to find that the problem under analysis can be readily solved
through the application of the provisions of a bilateral income tax treaty
to which the United States is a party.' That experience is often a re-
minder that, after the U.S. Constitution, an applicable bilateral income
tax treaty can have parity with the provisions of the I.R.C. Dependent
upon the situation, the provisions of the applicable tax treaty (rather than
a relevant statute) might be the "controlling authority. ' '2 However, hav-
ing determined that a tax treaty provision might be beneficial to a tax-
payer, the advisor might find that a superseding statute must be treated as
the controlling authority.3
* Vinson & Elkins Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center
1. Subchapter N ("Tax Based on Income From Sources Within or Without the United
States") of Chapter 1 ("Normal Taxes and Surtaxes") of the I.R.C. provides the statutory
rules for the federal income taxation of both "inbound" and "outbound" transactions and
persons.
2. I.R.C. § 894(a) (West 2006) provides that "[tihe provisions of this title [that is, the
Internal Revenue Code] shall be applied to any taxpayer with due regard to any treaty
obligation of the United States which applies to such taxpayer." I.R.C. § 7852(d)(1) pro-
vides that "[f]or purposes of determining the relationship between a provision of a treaty
and any law of the United States affecting revenue, neither the treaty nor the law shall
have preferential status by reason of its being a treaty or law." This latter provision re-
flects the U.S. rule that the "later in time" of either the treaty or the applicable statute
controls. Under the U.S. Constitution, U.S. treaties and federal statutes have equal status
as the supreme law of the land. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Consequently, when a conflict
exists between the treaty and the statute, the later in time prevails. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 (1986). This
approach is contrary to the rule in most other developed countries, that is, the priority
being the relevant country's (1) constitution or other fundamental document, (2) a treaty
and, then, (3) an enacted law.
3. As a rule of interpretation, U.S. courts will often seek to interpret and apply U.S.
treaties and federal statutes on the basis that a conflict does not exist. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 114 (1986). In some
instances, however, when enacting legislation the U.S. Congress will indicate that the appli-
cable legislation supersedes a treaty provision (including those in a tax treaty). Alterna-
tively, the legislative history might indicate that a conflict between the later statute and the
earlier treaty provision does not exist, although the lack of such conflict is extremely diffi-
cult to discern.
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The United States has an extensive network of bilateral income tax
treaties, numbering fifty-seven and covering sixty-five countries as of
early 2006.4 The United States also has a limited number of estate, gift,
and generation-skipping transfer tax treaties. 5 Other bilateral treaty vari-
ants in the tax context include "tax information exchange agreements,' 6
reciprocal shipping and aviation agreements, and Social Security totaliza-
tion agreements. 7 Even treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Naviga-
tion may be sufficiently expansive in certain situations to be applicable to
cross-border tax matters. 8
Some of these U.S. income tax treaties have been in effect for a consid-
erable period; some older treaties have been regularly supplemented with
protocols; and some are either quite recent replacements of older treaties
or are new treaties particularly with developing countries. Many Euro-
pean countries have much more extensive income tax treaty networks
than does the United States, partly because they have been much more
interested in their bilateral income tax treaty networks for an extended
period and also because many of those treaty partner countries have a
more accepting political environment in which to conclude a bilateral tax
treaty with smaller European countries (as contrasted to the United
4. This differential between the number of existing treaties and countries is attributa-
ble to the old U.S.S.R. treaty remaining applicable to various countries that were members
of the Soviet Union. A useful summary of outstanding U.S. tax treaties and ongoing tax
treaty negotiations is periodically included in Tax Management International Journal, a
monthly publication issued by Tax Management, Inc. The United States is identified as
having income tax treaties in force with sixty-five countries (as of December 15, 2005).
John Venuti et al., Current Status of U.S. Tax Treaties and International Tax Agreements, 35
TAx MGMT. INT'L J. 38, 39 (2006). Three treaties (or protocols) were identified as signed
and awaiting U.S. Senate approval. Id. at 40. The United States is identified as having
income tax treaties under negotiation with twenty-eight countries. Id. at 40-41.
5. They come in a variety of options. For example, some only deal with estate tax.
This paper does not examine the U.S. treaties dealing with transfer taxes. Note that the
expansion of these treaties has been essentially moribund for several decades, although
periodically a protocol to an existing estate tax treaty is entered into, often in conjunction
with the negotiation of an amendment to the income tax treaty with the same country.
Perhaps this ambivalence about transfer tax treaties derives from the larger issue in the
United States of the continuation, significant revision, or permanent elimination of the
federal estate, and generation skipping transfer taxes.
6. The United States is identified as also having exchange of tax information agree-
ments either in force or signed and awaiting final action or under negotiation. Venuti et
al., supra note 4, at 40. Many of the exchange of tax information agreements are with
countries in the Caribbean where the United States is interested in receiving information
from tax haven jurisdictions, but a U.S. bilateral income tax treaty is of limited value. Id.
at 43.
7. The objective of a social security totalization agreement is to ensure that during
the contributions phase taxation by two countries is limited, and during the distributions
phase credit is provided for contributions to the social security systems of several countries
for determining both eligibility and benefit amounts.
8. To reject the potential applicability of these treaties in the tax context, the U.S.
Congress may limit the types of international agreements which can provide benefits in a
particular tax context. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 884(e)(1) (West 2006) (specifying in the branch
profits tax provision that a potential branch profits tax exemption is only available if a
treaty "is an income tax treaty.").
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States, the "bull in the China shop"). 9 Consider, in this context for exam-
ple, the reluctance of many Latin American countries to enter into a bi-
lateral income tax treaty with the "big brother" United States to the
north and, also, the traditional perspective of many Arab countries not to
enter into economic-based treaties with the United States.
Similarly, the United States Government, that is, the U.S. Department
of the Treasury ("Treasury") periodically has been ambivalent about ex-
tending its income-tax treaty network.10 With each new presidential ad-
ministration, a considerable period of malaise (or antagonism) seems to
arise concerning whether the Treasury should pursue a program of revis-
ing older tax treaties and expanding the U.S. treaty network.11 Thereaf-
ter, as the particular presidential administration continues, the Treasury
representatives recognize the value of a modernized income tax treaty
network and pursue negotiations with multiple trading partners.1 2 Often
smaller countries with developing economies want to enter into a bilat-
eral tax treaty with the United States, but the U.S. tax treaty negotiators,
being overwhelmed with the volume of their activities, have been known
to present the U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty on a "take it or live it"
basis. This is certainly not the most diplomatic approach.
An objective of this article is to emphasize the importance of the im-
mense economic and political value to the United States of its bilateral
income tax treaty network and the importance to be paid to regularly
modernizing each of these treaties. 13 Hopefully, this objective is accom-
9. On a positive basis this can enable a U.S. enterprise to use an entity created in a
third country (for example, The Netherlands) to engage in outbound activities into a third
jurisdiction (for example, a developing country) with which the United States does not
have an existing income tax treaty. The benefits of the bilateral tax treaty between The
Netherlands and the destination country might be available (and the cost of using The
Netherlands as a "conduit country" would often be minimal). If a third country party used
The Netherlands-U.S. treaty to come into the United States, the "limitation on benefits"
article of that treaty would impose restrictions on its usage. But in the outbound context
(from the United States) such limitations are seldom applied (even if actually included in
the pertinent bilateral income tax treaty).
10. Perhaps some of this hesitancy is practical: a very high percentage (ninety-five
percent) of the investment and commercial transactions into and out of the United States
are already within the ambit of an existing U.S. bilateral income tax treaty.
11. Even though most U.S. treaties are negotiated under the jurisdiction of the U.S.
Department of State, the tax treaty is one of those situations where the treaty is negotiated
elsewhere (that is, by that department which has the most interest and expertise, the De-
partment of Treasury). Personnel within the Office of the International Tax Counsel (in
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Tax Policy) engage in negotiating these treaties,
often acting in conjunction with representatives of the Internal Revenue Service.
12. This motivation might also occur because important U.S. commercial interests are
making special pleas to the U.S. Government to address these issues for investment into
certain selected foreign countries.
13. As Patricia A. Brown, Deputy International Tax Counsel (Treaty Affairs), Depart-
ment of Treasury, noted, tax treaties are "part of the basic infrastructure of the global
marketplace." Pending Income Tax Agreements: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 109th Cong. 1 (2006) (testimony of Patricia A. Brown, Deputy International Tax
Counsel (Treaty Affairs), United States Department of the Treasury) [hereinafter Brown
Testimony]. See also id. (statement of Richard G. Lugar, Chairman, S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations), (testimony of the Staff, J. Comm. on Taxation), (testimony of William A.
Reinsch, President, National Foreign Trade Council).
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plished by identifying a variety of important issues confronting the cur-
rent evolution of U.S. tax treaty policy.14As identified below, during 2005
and continuing into 2006, the Bush Administration has seemed to recog-
nize the importance of having a coherent tax treaty policy and has accel-
erated efforts to solve outstanding income tax treaty issues through a
multiplicity of techniques.
II. THE PURPOSES AND BENEFITS OF BILATERAL INCOME
TAX TREATIES
Income tax treaties provide benefits to both taxpayers and govern-
ments by establishing clear ground rules that will govern income tax mat-
ters relating to trade and investment conducted by residents of the two
treaty countries. 15 The specific objectives of these tax treaties can include
the following:16
1. As an overarching objective to recognize how the tax systems of two
countries can work in harmony so that individual taxpayers do not get
entangled in the middle between the taxing authorities of two national
governments. 17
2. To determine whether the activities of particular taxpayers are suffi-
cient to cause those taxpayers to be subjected to taxation in another
country by reason of cross-border activities. The inquiry in this context is
whether the economic activity in the destination country is of such sub-
stance that the destination country should be permitted to exercise taxing
jurisdiction over the profits derived in that country from those activities.
The tax treaty will identify the circumstances causing tax jurisdiction to
exist in the destination country. Otherwise, the sole taxing jurisdiction
14. For a comprehensive analysis of U.S. income tax treaty policy as of the 1990s see
AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED
STATES INCOME TAXATION II: PROPOSALS ON UNITED STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES
(1992).
15. Brown Testimony, supra note 13, at 1-2. As economic cooperation among multiple
jurisdictions advances, the adoption of multilateral income tax treaties can eventually be
anticipated. On a quite limited basis, a foundation for such arrangements on the U.S. side
might begin to develop through the implementation of multilateral "Advanced Pricing
Agreements." Of course, on the European side, the E.U.-coordinated tax policy endeavors
are tending in a similar direction.
16. See id at 2. A review of the structure and provisions of a bilateral tax treaty will
confirm that these are separate elements in a tax treaty, including in the various "Articles"
of a treaty appropriately designated by specific subject matter. Note that, as specified in
the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, the Treasury was instructed to perform the
following:
[C]onduct a study of United States income tax treaties to identify any inap-
propriate reduction in United States withholding tax to provide opportuni-
ties for shifting income out of the United States, and to evaluate whether
existing anti-abuse mechanisms are operating properly. The study shall in-
clude specific recommendations to address all inappropriate uses of tax trea-
ties. Not later than June 30, 2005, such Secretary or delegate shall submit to
the Congress a report of such study.
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 806(b), 118 Stat. 1418, 1575.
As of mid 2006 that study had not been released by the U.S. Treasury.
17. See Brown Testimony, supra note 13, at 2.
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for a taxpayer's economic activities should reside in the taxpayer's home
country, that is, at the "residence." 18
3. When taxing jurisdiction does exist (as determined under the appli-
cable income tax treaty) to protect taxpayers from potential double taxa-
tion through the allocation of taxing rights between the two treaty
partner countries. The treaty will ordinarily identify where the primary
right to tax a specific item of income exists, whether at the situs location
where the income arises or in the residence jurisdiction. In this process,
the treaty can identify the source location for a particular item of income.
Further, particularly with respect to "mobile" income (for example, divi-
dends, interest, and royalties), the treaty might shift the primary (or ex-
clusive) taxing jurisdiction to the residence country and away from the
source country. 19 This is often accomplished by reducing or eliminating
the income tax rate applicable at the source. That tax is ordinarily col-
lected through a withholding at source mechanism. 20
4. To ensure that disputes concerning taxing jurisdiction can be re-
solved through administrative procedures with cooperation between the
two taxing authorities. This is commonly referred to as the "Competent
Authority" mechanism. 2 l
5. To ensure that foreign taxpayers are not discriminated against in
favor of host-country taxpayers. 22 This is ordinarily accomplished under
18. See id.
19. The treatment of tax deductions can also be impacted by tax treaty provisions.
See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2005-53, 2005-32 I.R.B. 263 (the I.R.S. determined that the method
for determining a bank's interest expense (as prescribed in Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5 (as
amended in 1996)) was inapplicable by reason of provisions in the United Kingdom and
Japan treaties with the United States). See Exchange of Notes, Convention Between the
Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America for the Avoid-
ance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Income from James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Dep't of State, to Ryozo Kato,
Ambassador of Japan (Nov. 6, 2003) (on file with U.S. Dep't of State); Exchange of Notes,
Convention Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income
and on Capital Gains from William S. Farish, Ambassador, to Richard Wilkinson, CVO,
Dir. Ams., Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London (July 24, 2001) (on file with U.S.
Dep't of State).
20. This reduction of the tax liability at source on mobile income recognizes that these
withholding taxes are imposed on a gross basis, and since deductions are not allowable the
effective tax rate on this income can be high (and, in some instances, confiscatory). Brown
Testimony, supra note 13, at 2. In many situations, a more appropriate approach under a
conflict of laws approach is to impose taxation at residence rather than at source. When
taxed at residence this foreign source income will ordinarily be subject to tax on a compre-
hensive net income basis.
21. On the U.S. side, the responsibility for acting as the "Competent Authority" has
been delegated by the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury to the Director, International
(LMSB) of the I.R.S. Brown Testimony, supra note 13, at 2. This concept of "Competent
Authority" contemplates that segment of the I.R.S. that is "duly authorized" by an appro-
priate Delegation of Authority from the Secretary of the Treasury (rather than the analysis
of a disgruntled student/I.R.S. employee in the author's class several years ago who as-
serted that the I.R.S. could not possibly have any "competent" authority).
22. Although the tax treaty provisions do not ordinarily apply to state and local taxa-
tion, the non-discrimination provision of an income tax treaty is ordinarily extended to also
2006]
SMU LAW REVIEW
a "non-discrimination" provision that provides for "national treatment"
of inbound investors. 23 Of course, discrimination and the existence of
comparable status in this context is often in the "eye of the beholder"
and, consequently, comparability status can be (and often is) treated as
not existing.24
6. To deal with specialized situations involving individuals where tax
jurisdictional conflicts may arise, including the treatment of (a) receipts
from Social Security benefits and other government based retirement
benefits, (b) private retirement plan benefits, (c) alimony, and (d) child
support. Tax jurisdictional issues can arise in this context because, for
example, the economic rights may have accrued (as is the case for retire-
ment plan benefits) on a tax deferred basis while a taxpayer was a resi-
dent in one country, and, thereafter, that taxpayer receives the payment
of these benefits after retirement while residing in another jurisdiction.
7. To enable the exchange of information between taxing authorities so
as to monitor the tax reporting of various income items by taxpayers hav-
ing contacts, business activities, and investments in the two jurisdictions.
This can be accomplished through "spontaneous exchanges," 25 specific
requests for information, and the exchange of information to resolve an
individual tax controversy. 26 For the Treasury, this information exchange
encompass state and local taxation, often to the consternation of those local taxing
officials.
23. For a discussion of the tax treaty anti-discrimination provision in the context of the
federal tax (non)recognition of same-sex marriages, see Arthur C. Infanti, Prying Open the
Closet Door: The Defense of Marriage Act and Tax Treaties, 105 TAx NOTES 563 (2004),
noting that each of the income tax treaties with Belgium, Canada, The Netherlands, and
Spain contains a non-discrimination article that prohibits the United States from taxing
citizens of the other country in another or more burdensome fashion than it taxes its own
citizens in the same circumstances. The heart of this article consists of a discussion of the
relationship between the non-discrimination provisions in these treaties and the U.S. "De-
fense of Marriage Act" ("DOMA"). Professor Infanti concludes that a tenable argument
can be made that DOMA should not be given priority over the tax treaty provisions and
that, as a result, the I.R.S. (and, in many cases, state and local tax authorities) should be
required to recognize for tax purposes the marriages of resident alien same-sex couples
who are citizens of Belgium, Canada, The Netherlands, or Spain.
24. See Brown Testimony, supra note 13, at 3, indicating in this context the following:
[T]ax treaties clarify the manner in which possible discrimination is to be
treated in the tax context. Particular rules are needed here, for example, to
reflect the fact that foreign persons that are subject to tax in the host country
only on certain income may not be in the same position as domestic taxpay-
ers that may be subject to tax in such country on all their income.
25. For example, this might include the sending of copies of IRS Form 1099 informa-
tional returns to the counterpart national taxing authority.
26. The transfer of this tax information is permitted on the U.S. side by I.R.C.
§ 6103(k)(4) (West 2006), which specifies that a return or return information may be dis-
closed to a competent authority of a foreign government that has an income tax convention
(or gift and estate tax convention) or other convention or bilateral agreement relating to
the exchange of tax information with the United States, but only to the extent provided in,
and subject to, the terms and conditions of such convention or bilateral agreement. Other-
wise, I.R.C. § 6103(a) would be applicable, which specifies that tax returns and tax return
information shall be confidential and (except as otherwise authorized) no officer or em-
ployee of the United States (or certain other identified individuals) shall disclose any re-
turn or tax return information obtained by him in any manner in connection with his
service as such as an officer or an employee or otherwise or under the provisions of this
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element of a bilateral tax treaty has immense importance. 27
In this context, an overarching objective of a presidential administra-
tion could be to use bilateral income tax treaties as one of the numerous
elements in implementing a cohesive international economic program.
The Treasury will often have its own revenue estimates for measuring the
impact of various tax treaty provisions (for example, the tax withholding-
on-interest provision). Treasury's tax treaty negotiators will know the an-
ticipated cross border impact (for both inbound and outbound directions)
of the reduction of an interest or dividend withholding tax rate.28 As
Deputy International Tax Counsel Brown indicated: "Because the cover-
age of our treaty network is already quite comprehensive, it frequently
will make more sense, as an economic matter, for the United States to
negotiate an update to an existing agreement, rather than to negotiate a
full treaty with a new treaty partner. '29
This statement reaffirms that the income taxation of most economic
transactions in and out of the United States is already within the coverage
of a bilateral income tax treaty, with the I.R.C. provisions filling in the
gaps at the edges of tax treaty coverage. Ms. Brown also indicated the
following in her statement: "Each treaty that we present to the Senate
section. Similarly, information received from a tax treaty partner country shall not be dis-
closed. See I.R.C. § 6105.
27. See Brown Testimony, supra note 13, at 3, specifying the following:
[Blecause access to information from other countries is critically important
to the full and fair enforcement of the U.S. tax laws, information exchange is
a priority for the United States in its tax treaty program. If a country has
bank secrecy rules that would operate to prevent or seriously inhibit the ap-
propriate exchange of information under a tax treaty, we [the Treasury ] will
not conclude a treaty with that country. Indeed, the need for appropriate
information exchange provisions is one of the treaty matters that we consider
non-negotiable.
28. For example, rumors abounded that the United States was reluctant for a consider-
able period to renegotiate the Japan-U.S. income tax treaty because of the withholding tax
being collected on outbound interest payments and because Japanese lenders were receiv-
ing considerably more interest income from the United States than the interest flowing
inbound into the United States from Japan. See, e.g., J. Comm. on Taxation, JTC Explains
Proposed Protocol to Netherlands-US. Income Tax Treaty (JCX-54-04), TAX NoTEs To-
DAY, Sept. 16, 2004, LEXIS, 2004 TNT 181-5.
29. Brown Testimony, supra note 13, at 3 (emphasis added). This statement further
notes the following:
[S]uch a full agreement will require the potential treaty partner to grapple
with many of the complexities of U.S. domestic and international tax rules
and U.S. tax treaty policy, and how it interacts with its own domestic law and
policies. Thus, the primary constraint on the size of our tax treaty network
may be the complexity of the negotiations themselves.
Id. at 3. The various functions performed by tax treaties, and most particularly the need to
mesh the particular tax systems of the two treaty partners, make the negotiation process
exacting and time-consuming for the government representatives on both sides. Id. Peri-
odically Treasury representatives have informally indicated that those (smaller) countries
who want a tax treaty with the United States can adopt the U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty
on a "take it or leave it" basis. The problem with that approach now is that the Treasury
Model dated 1996 is significantly outdated and, consequently, no real "model" exists to
"take or leave." See United States Model Income Tax Convention, Sept. 20, 1996, availa-




represents not only the best deal that we believe we can achieve with the
particular country but also constitutes an agreement that we believe is in
the best interests of the United States."'30
Although these are designated as "treaties," taxpayers and their repre-
sentatives must also be aware that these arrangements are bilateral "con-
tracts" entered into between the United States and one other national
state after serious negotiations. Consequently, each side will want to en-
sure that its own special interests are protected as part of the bilateral
trade and investment arrangements between the two countries. Tax
treaty partners to the United States are often quite careful (often with the
advice of Washington, D.C.-based international tax counsel) to make cer-
tain that any subsequent fundamental tax treaty policy changes imple-
mented by the United States will also inure to the benefit of the nation
state currently entering into a treaty contract with the United States. 31
Further, the United States is careful to ensure that the tax treaty's ben-
eficiary will be taxable in the other treaty country, thereby preventing the
tax treaty's exploitation by persons in a third country.32 The use of a U.S.
income tax treaty by third country residents is not perceived as being
consistent with the "treaty deal." Further, preventing this exploitation of
the provisions of a bilateral treaty by a third country party "is critical to
ensuring that the third country will sit down at the table with us to negoti-
ate on a reciprocal basis, so that we can secure for U.S. persons the bene-
fits of reductions in source country tax on their investments in that
country. ' 33
III. THE UNITED STATES AND THE OECD MODEL INCOME
TAX TREATIES
The United States has traditionally issued its own model income tax
treaty which has ordinarily constituted the initial position of the Treasury
30. Brown Testimony, supra note 13, at 4.
31. An example of this is in the Bangladesh-U.S. income tax treaty being considered
by the U.S. Senate for ratification during 2006. This proposed treaty specifies that double
taxation relief will be provided through the foreign tax credit mechanism. Id. at 10. How-
ever, this convention does not include a "tax sparing credit" since such credits are contrary
to current U.S. tax treaty policy. Id. The "tax sparing credit" is a mechanism sometimes
used by other developed countries to provide a hypothetical credit to offset the income tax
liability otherwise incurred in the home country when the destination country (often a
developing country) imposes little or no tax so as to encourage economic development
within that country. With no tax sparing the income tax burden would merely be shifted to
the residence jurisdiction (as is the result of current U.S. tax policy, but is usually avoided
through the imposition for a foreign country subsidiary). At Bangladesh's request, the
exchange of diplomatic notes accompanying the proposed treaty provides that if the
United States alters its policy regarding the granting of tax sparing credits or provides for
such credits in another treaty, U.S.-Bangladesh negotiations will be reopened with a view
to concluding a protocol that would offer similar benefits to Bangladesh. Id. Although
this change in policy is only a remote possibility, the future U.S. adoption of a territorial
approach to U.S. cross-border income taxation would essentially achieve the objective of
immunizing this income (and might trigger a review in this context).
32. See discussion of the "limitations on benefits" provisions infra Part VIII.B.
33. Brown Testimony, supra note 13, at 5.
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in commencing bilateral tax treaty negotiations with a particular country.
The Treasury issued the Model Treaty in 1996 and also issued an accom-
panying Technical Explanation.34 Rumors circulated, particularly during
2005, that a revised Model Treaty would be released during the year 2005,
but that has not occurred as of mid 2006.35 Perhaps the latter part of the
year 2006 will see an updated version of the Model Treaty (and an accom-
panying Technical Explanation). 36 Since its release, the 1996 Model
Treaty has become significantly outmoded, particularly when contrasted
with recently implemented bilateral income tax treaties.37 Treaty negoti-
ators from treaty partner countries are quite aware of this evolution as to
many provisions in the U.S. Model Treaty. These countries (if alert) also
often find informed advice useful (often from Washington, D.C.-based
international tax advisors) concerning these items and the significance of
these matters in the context of the particular tax treaty negotiation. The
international tax advisor must, therefore, piece together the changes im-
plemented in the most recently negotiated U.S. income tax treaties to
discern the current possible negotiating position of the United States on a
particular treaty issue. The Treasury may also indirectly indicate that its
tax treaty negotiating position has fundamentally changed (at least as to
countries in basically the same economic situation). For example, in the
Treasury's Technical Explanation to the income tax treaty between the
United Kingdom and the United States, the Treasury indicated that, in
the negotiations, the parties took into account recent income tax treaties
negotiated by both parties, signaling that in some areas its fundamental
positions have changed. 38
34. See Model Treaty, supra note 29; see also I.R.S., UNITED STATES INCOME TAX
CONVENTION OF SEPTEMBER 20, 1996: TECHNICAL EXPLANATION (1996), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/techxpln.pdf [hereinafter TECHNICAL Ex-
PLANA-
TION].
35. Perhaps the concern is that either the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (the
relevant committee for approving treaties, including tax treaties) or the Senate Finance
Committee (not having jurisdiction over tax treaty ratification, but being concerned about
the direction of international taxation and, therefore, tax treaty policy) would hold a public
hearing to address the important elements of the revised Model Treaty. During the normal
tax treaty ratification process the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation prepares a
summary of the particular treaty under review and often makes a comparison to the Model
Treaty, but a review of fundamental tax treaty policy could be a much larger inquiry which
many would prefer to avoid.
36. See Brown Testimony, supra note 13, at 10, indicating the following as of February
2, 2006:
Work on the U.S. Model was well advanced last year [2005] but was delayed
due to other commitments. However, we expect to forward a draft text to
the staffs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Joint Committee
on Taxation within the next month. We look forward to working with them
on this project.
37. For example, in revised treaties with Japan, the United Kingdom, The Nether-
lands, Mexico, and Sweden, the withholding tax at source on dividends paid by an affiliate
to its foreign parent corporation was eliminated. The Model Treaty provides for a mini-
mum five percent on such dividends. See Model Treaty, supra note 29, at 10.
38. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE CONVENTION BE-
TWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT
2006]
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The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD"), consisting primarily of the developed countries, also has
promulgated its own model income tax treaty ("OECD Model Treaty"). 39
Unlike the U.S. Model income tax treaty, the OECD Model Treaty is
under regular review and analysis, therefore incorporating current tax
treaty positions from the perspectives of multiple countries. 40 The
OECD has working parties (Technical Advisory Groups or "TAGs") reg-
ularly examining income tax treaty positions and the OECD periodically
issues updates to incorporate changes or refinements in positions, incor-
porated into its model treaty. Although the United States is an active
participant in the OECD, including the regular examination of possible
changes in the OECD Model Treaty, this is truly an international effort
(ordinarily European dominated).41 Because the OECD Model Treaty is
under regular review, this model treaty has become the real "yardstick"
for constructing and revising bilateral income tax treaties around the
world. The OECD Model Treaty significantly influences any potential
treaty partners with the United States. Consequently, even the Treasury
representatives may also often be influenced by the OECD Model Treaty,
more than the traditional perspective of starting negotiations from the
U.S. Model Treaty, as including recent specific country treaty negotiation
provisions. 42
IV. THE U.S. TAX TREATY RATIFICATION PROCESS
The U.S. tax treaty ratification process has interesting political compo-
nents that influence attitudes towards U.S. tax treaty policy. Under the
United States Constitution, a treaty (including a tax treaty) must have the
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND NORTHERN IRELAND FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE
TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON IN-
COME AND ON CAPITAL GAINS 1 (2001).
39. The United States and twenty-nine other countries are the members of the OECD.
See Brown Testimony, supra note 13, at 3.
40. This model treaty (or its prior versions) constitutes the cornerstone for the adop-
tion of approximately 3,000 bilateral tax treaties in the world. OECD Model Tax Conven-
tion, July 15, 2005 [hereinafter OECD Model Treaty]. This model treaty is accompanied by
a Commentary providing an explanation of the various provisions. This commentary is
often used by judicial bodies as the controlling legislative history for the interpretation of a
particular bilateral tax treaty provision when in litigation over a precise tax treaty issue.
See OECD, OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION COMMENTARY (2005) [hereinafter OECD
COMMENTARY].
41. One continuing OECD endeavor is to examine the rules relevant to the impact of
tax applicability in a cross-border electronic environment.
42. Some do not agree that the agenda of the OECD in the tax context is to promote a
reasonably balanced income tax treaty approach, but rather to assert that the OECD pri-
marily constitutes a conspiracy to keep tax rates high. See Daniel J. Mitchell, The Paris-
Based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: Pushing Anti-U.S. Poli-
cies with American Tax Dollars, 6 PROSPERITAS 1, 1 (2006), available at
www.freedomandprosperity.org (stating that the OECD "international bureaucracy en-
dorses higher taxes, more spending and tax harmonization. These policies may be in the
short-term interest of the high-tax nations that dominate OECD decision-making, but they
surely are not in the interests of the United States.").
[Vol. 59
U.S. Tax Treaties
"advice and consent" of the U.S. Senate to achieve effectiveness. 43
Under international protocol, a U.S. tax treaty does not technically be-
come effective until both approval by the U.S. Senate and, thereafter, an
exchange between the two governments of ratification instruments. 44
Under the rules of the United States Senate, the matter of the ratifica-
tion of treaties (including tax treaties) is within the jurisdiction of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 45 Jurisdiction over tax treaties
does not reside with the Senate Finance Committee, which does have
general jurisdiction over federal taxation matters. This generates some
feelings of resentment from members of the Senate Finance Committee,
who view the subject of taxation as within their particular domain.46 This
problem was (unsuccessfully) sought to be resolved by a change in the
rules of the U.S. Senate. 47
43. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
44. See, for example, the Treasury Technical Explanation of the Sweden-U.S. Income
Tax Treaty Protocol, which notes that Article VIII of the Protocol contains the rules for
bringing the Protocol into force and giving effect to its provisions. DEP'T OF THE TREA-
SURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE PROTOCOL SIGNED AT WASHINGTON ON SEPTEM-
BER 30, 2005 AMENDING THE CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION AND
THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME, SIGNED AT
WASHINGTON ON SEPTEMBER 1, 1994, art. VIII (2006). Paragraph 1 provides for the ratifi-
cation of the Convention by both Contracting States according to their applicable proce-
dures. Id. para. 1. Each State must notify the other as soon as its requirements for
ratification have been complied with. Id. The convention is to enter into force on the
thirtieth day after the later of such notification accompanied by an instrument of ratifica-
tion. Id. This Explanation indicates that, in the United States, the process leading to ratifi-
cation and entry into force is as follows: Once a protocol or treaty has been signed by
authorized representatives of the two Contracting States, the Department of State sends
the protocol or treaty to the President who formally transmits it to the Senate for its advice
and consent to ratification, which requires approval by two-thirds of the Senators present
and voting. Id. Prior to the vote, however, it generally has been the practice of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations to hold hearings on the protocol or treaty and make a
recommendation regarding its approval to the full Senate. Id. Both Government and pri-
vate sector witnesses may testify at these hearings. Id. After receiving the Senate's advice
and consent to ratification, the protocol or treaty is returned to the President for his signa-
ture on the ratification document. Id. The President's signature on the document com-
pletes the process in the United States. Id. Similarly, see OECD Model Treaty Article
30(1) which indicates that a convention shall be ratified "and the instruments of ratifica-
tion" shall be exchanged as soon as possible. OECD Model Treaty, supra note 40. Article
30(2) of the OECD Model Treaty indicates that the convention shall enter into force "upon
exchange of instruments of ratification." Id. art. 30(2).
45. See STANDING R. OF THE S. xxvl(j)(1)(17). At a February 2, 2006 Senate Foreign
Relations Committee hearing concerning various pending U.S. income tax treaties, Chair-
man Richard Lugar indicated that maintaining and expanding the U.S. tax treaty network
is a "vital endeavor." See Senate to Move Quickly on Pending Tax Treaties with Sweden,
France, Bangladesh, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 3, 2006, LEXIS, 2006 TNT 23-4.
46. See STANDING R. OF THE S. xxv(1)(j)(1)(17) (specifying that the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee has jurisdiction over treaties and executive agreements, except recip-
rocal trade agreements); STANDING R. OF THE S. xxv(l)(i)(7) (indicating that the Senate
Finance Committee has jurisdiction over reciprocal trade agreements).
47. An interesting proposal concerning this tax treaty review jurisdiction was included
in the Senate version of "Jumpstart Our Business Strength Act," ("JOBS"), as Act Section
236 in the modification of the Chairman's Mark. STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION,
MODIFICATION OF THE CHAIRMAN'S MARK ON THE "JUMPSTART OUR BUSINESS
STRENGTH (JOBS) ACT," JCX-85-03 (2003). The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
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As required by the U.S. Constitution, tax legislation starts in the House
of Representatives. 48 Treaties do not constitute legislation for this pur-
pose. Since treaties are subject to the "advice and consent" of the U.S.
Senate (and not the U.S. House of Representatives), the tax writers in the
House of Representatives are also not very interested in the tax treaty
process. For this reason, these tax writers are more inclined to adopt leg-
islation which may even be contrary to (that is, "override") a tax treaty
provision, since they have little political capital invested in the tax treaty
process and are often somewhat inimical to tax treaties as being part of
the U.S. international tax structure. A delicate balance exists in this con-
text. Consequently, one result of the constitutional requirement that tax
bills originate in the House of Representatives is that a U.S. tax treaty
can only reduce potential U.S. tax liabilities, that is, it can not be used to
impose any greater tax liabilities.
V. U.S. LEGISLATION MAKING EXISTING TREATY
PROVISIONS OBSOLETE
As noted, since under the U.S. Constitution tax treaties are only rati-
fied by the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives is (at best)
ambivalent about tax treaties and is sometimes inclined to adopt tax legis-
lation overriding existing tax treaty provisions. However, even without
this specific objective in mind, the comprehensive restructuring of tax leg-
islation impacting cross border transactions can result in requiring the
Treasury to renegotiate many of its tax treaties. Thus, on occasion a sig-
nificant change in internal tax laws can make certain provisions of appli-
cable income tax treaties irrelevant.
For example, a significant change has been suggested for the taxation
of foreign earnings of branches and foreign corporations controlled by
U.S. corporations by a proposal where dividend exemption would be pro-
vided for that portion of dividends received by a U.S. corporation from a
was to be required to consult with the Senate Committee on Finance with respect to pro-
posed tax treaties prior to reporting any such treaty to the Senate. Id. at 20. The Senate
Committee on Finance would be required to respond in writing within 120 days of receipt
of a request for consultation from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Id. If the
Senate Committee on Finance did not respond within this time period, the Finance Com-
mittee would be considered to have waived the right to consult with respect to the provi-
sions of the tax treaty. Id. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations would be required
to consider the views of the Senate Committee on Finance when reporting a tax treaty to
the Senate and would be required to include the views of the Senate Committee on Fi-
nance in its report to the Senate. Id. This legislation was to provide an amendment to the
STANDING R. OF THE S.," xxv(1)(j), rather than an amendment to the I.R.C. See id.; STAFF
OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, ADDITIONAL MODIFICATIONS TO THE CHAIRMAN'S
MARK OR THE "JUMPSTART OUR BUSINESS STRENGTH ('JOBS'), ACT" JCX-87-03 (2003).
This proposal did not survive the final legislation, but presumably the Senate Finance
Committee made its point on this issue.
48. All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but
the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills. U.S. CONST., art. 1,
§ 7, cl. 1.
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controlled foreign corporation attributable to active business earnings. 49
Since the classical system of corporation/shareholder income taxation
would be significantly modified by any such legislation, the fundamental
premises of most U.S. income tax treaties would be undermined by any
such changes. For this reason the proposal indicates the following:
The proposed system would require the renegotiation of existing in-
come tax treaties, which are premised on the assumption that the
United States will continue to operate a worldwide tax system. For
example, existing treaties generally require the United States to al-
low foreign tax credits for foreign corporate income taxes and divi-
dend withholding taxes under certain circumstances. These treaties
would have to be revised to reflect the conversion from a credit
mechanism to an exemption mechanism. 50
The modification of all tax treaties to accommodate such a change would
present a serious challenge to the Treasury's tax treaty representatives
who negotiate tax treaties.
VI. THE PROCESS OF INTERPRETATION FOR
TAX TREATIES
A. BASIC APPROACHES TO TAX TREATY ANALYSIS
In considering tax treaty applicability, the tax advisor must be continu-
ally aware of the wide variety of techniques (some unique to the treaty
context) used to amplify and interpret tax treaty provisions. In research-
ing a narrow issue in the domestic statutory context, a tax planner will
examine the potential existence of a solution in Treasury Regulations,
published Revenue Rulings, Revenue Procedures, private letter rulings,
and other IRS pronouncements. This universe of interpretive material is
similarly applicable and available in the tax treaty context, but the pos-
sibilities of significant additional sources must be considered. The identi-
fication of these additional sources reinforces the premise of this article,
that is, that tax treaties are of a unique character in considering tax
planning.
The Technical Explanation of the Model Treaty is often a good place to
start, but this is only the beginning. Reference to this Technical Explana-
tion reminds us that (1) the bilateral income tax treaty is a two-party
agreement, but (2) the Technical Explanation is ordinarily only a one-
party document (that is, a unilateral pronouncement by the Treasury).
The Technical Explanation provides the perspective of the U.S. side con-
cerning a particular treaty provision, but in the interpretation of a partic-
ular provision, the treaty partner country may not be in agreement. If
considered in advance of particular bilateral tax treaty negotiations, a
specific issue might be considered and addressed in any accompanying
49. See STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLI-
ANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES, JCS-02-05, at 186-97 (2005).
50. Id. at 192-93.
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exchange of diplomatic "notes," but often these issues are not adequately
addressed until identified after the treaty becomes effective. The issue
may be addressed in a Technical Explanation of the particular bilateral
income tax treaty, often released shortly after the conclusion of a new (or
revised) treaty, but again, this is ordinarily only the Treasury's perspec-
tive. The Treasury representatives may have given their counterparts
from the treaty partner country an advance opportunity to comment on
the draft Technical Explanation, but the Treasury representatives may not
have included any objections or adverse comments when releasing that
specific Technical Explanation. Ordinarily, the treaty partner does not
release its own Technical Explanation (or other interpretive guidance) or
release a statement of objection, so tax advisors may not necessarily be
able to identify where the conflicts exist.
B. THE "MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING" APPROACH
When significant technical issues subsequently do arise concerning tax
treaty interpretation, the question often presents itself concerning
whether the treaty should be amended by protocol or whether that pro-
cess can be circumvented through the issuance by the Internal Revenue
Service ("Service") of either (1) a unilateral interpretation or (2) some
agreement with a representative of the other government, such as a Mem-
orandum of Understanding ("MOU"). The MOU is treated as not neces-
sitating U.S. Senate "advice and consent." The position of the Service in
implementing an MOU is that it is merely an interpretation of provisions
within the treaty and, therefore, is permitted within the already existing
jurisdiction of the Competent Authority. 51 A protocol constitutes an
amendment to the original treaty, thereby necessitating further "advice
and consent" from the U.S. Senate before it can become effective.52
Whether a protocol is required (rather than merely a unilateral interpre-
tation) can be a close issue, and of course, the U.S. government repre-
sentatives would often like, if possible, to avoid the necessity of being
forced to clear the hurdle of obtaining Senate approval. This ratification
process both takes time and requires a serious, rational explanation
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by both Treasury repre-
sentatives and members of the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.
During 2005 and early 2006, the Service and Treasury have been active
in the implementation of MOUs. MOUs are signed on behalf of the
United States Government by the Director, International ("LMSB"), as
the IRS Competent Authority, thereby representing that these are merely
administrative decisions (and do not necessitate U.S. Senate approval).
For example, the United States and Japan have entered into a MOU on
the meaning of "investment bank" under the United States-Japan income
51. In most of the MOUs, the parties merely state the particular treaty article they are
interpreting without identifying their authority to enter into a specific agreement.
52. The protocol is treated as a modification of the treaty and, therefore, necessitates
similar treatment as a treaty.
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tax treaty.53 The United States and Canada have entered into a MOU on
resolving factual disputes under the mutual agreement procedure
("MAP") specified in the Canada-United States income tax treaty,54 and
the United States and Mexico have entered into a MOU concerning lim-
ited liability companies and the treatment of fiscally transparent entities
under the Mexico-United States income tax treaty.5 5 Other examples in-
clude the Agreement on Treaty Benefits between the U.S. and Swiss com-
petent authorities regarding the Limitation of Benefits Article of the
income tax treaty and an accompanying Revised Memorandum of Un-
derstanding between the United States and the Swiss Confederation. 56
The Service seems willing to use the MOU technique in a variety of areas,
premised upon the assumption that the basic matter is included within the
fundamental scope of the income tax treaty itself (and therefore, author-
ity exists to interpret and apply the terms of the existing treaty).
C. REFERENCE TO FOREIGN LAW AND FOREIGN COURTS
Many provisions in income tax treaties are quite uniform (including the
OECD Model Treaty, which has provisions similar to those in specific
U.S. income tax treaties). 57 The primary source of guidance in this con-
text for the resolution of tax treaty controversies arising in foreign courts
is often the Commentary to the OECD Model Treaty ("OECD Commen-
tary"). This is provided by the OECD Secretariat as a detailed explana-
53. I.R.S., I.R.S. Announces Japan Investment Bank Memorandum of Understanding,
TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan. 23, 2006, LEXIS, 2006 TNT 14-7.
54. I.R.S., I.R.S. Announces U.S.-Canada Memorandum of Understanding on Mutual
Agreement Procedure, TAX NoTEs TODAY, June 23, 2006, LEXIS, 2006 TNT 14-8. The
purpose of this MOU is to establish an independent review process for resolving disagree-
ments regarding the underlying facts and circumstances ("factual disagreement") of a spe-
cific mutual agreement procedure case for further negotiations by the Competent
Authorities. Id. A factual disagreement is identified as a disagreement concerning any of
(i) the existence of a fact (for example, whether a party made a payment or not), (ii) the
relevance of a fact agreed to exist (for example, if the payment was made, is that fact
relevant to determining the transfer price for transactions covered by the MAP case), or
(iii) the significance to be accorded a fact agreed to exist (for example, what significance
should be given to the fact that a payment was made). Id.
55. I.R.S., I.R.S. Announces Mexico LLC MAP Agreement, TAX NoTEs TODAY, Jan.
23, 2006, LEXIS, 2006 TNT 14-9 (indicating that it is understood that income from sources
within one of the Contracting States received by an entity that is organized in either of the
Contracting States, or a third state with which Mexico has in force a comprehensive ex-
change of information agreement, and that is treated as fiscally transparent under the laws
of either Contracting State will be treated as income derived by a resident of the other
Contracting State to the extent that such income is subject to tax as the income of a resi-
dent of the other Contracting State). See also I.R.S. Announcement 2005-72, 2005-41
I.R.B. 692 (providing Press Release IR-2005-107, Director, International, U.S. Competent
Authority, United States Mexico Reach Mutual Agreement Regarding Eligibility of Fis-
cally Transparent Entities to Benefits (Sept. 19, 2005), which announced that the United
States and Mexico had reached a mutual agreement regarding the eligibility of entities that
are treated as fiscally transparent under the laws of either country for the benefits of the
1992 U.S.-Mexico Income Tax Treaty).
56. I.R.S. Announcement 2003-59, 2003-40 I.R.B. 746; Press Release IR-2003-103,
I.R.S., United States, Swiss Competent Authorities Provide Guidance on Tax Treaty Bene-
fits (Aug. 22, 2003).
57. Compare OECD Model Treaty, supra note 40, with Model Treaty, supra note 29.
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tion of the various articles of the OECD Model Treaty. The question
often arises in the United States concerning whether a foreign legal au-
thority, such as a court decision in a foreign jurisdiction or analysis such
as the OECD Commentary, is relevant and, perhaps persuasive, in resolv-
ing a controversy in a U.S. court involving a similar income tax treaty
provision. For example, in Taisei Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Com-
missioner,58 Judge Tannenwald relied on the 1963 OECD Commentary in
examining whether a "permanent establishment" existed when Japanese
property and casualty insurance companies were enabled to write reinsur-
ance through a U.S. corporation operating in the United States.59 Fur-
ther, in this case, a decision of the Federal Republic of Germany Tax
Court (at Bremen) was found relevant by the Tax Court.6° Although not-
ing that this case had clearly distinguishable facts, the implication is that
the foreign court authority, here a German case, could certainly be ex-
ceedingly useful in the Tax Court's decision making if the case is relevant.
Similarly, in a supplemental memorandum opinion to Podd v. Commis-
sioner,61 the court noted that Paragraph 2 of Article IV of the U.S.-Ca-
nada treaty,
would require a decision as to whether petitioner had a permanent
home available to him in either the United States or Canada...
during 1990. Art. 4, par. 2 [of the OECD Model Treaty (1977)] con-
tains substantially the same language as the above-quoted Art. IV.,
par. 2, of the Canada Convention. The commentary to the [OECD]
Model Treaty ... further explains the requirements of Model Treaty
Art. 4. Because both the United States and Canada were OECD
members when the Model Treaty and the commentary were drafted,
courts have used the commentary to interpret income tax treaties
between the United States and Canada. See United States v. A.L.
Burbank & Co., 525 F.2d 9, 15 (2d Cir. 1975); Birth W. Life Assur-
ance Co. of Canada v. Commissioner; see also Taisei Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Commissioner... (which construed the [United States-
Japan treaty] with reference to the Model Treaty and its
commentary). 62
The United States Tax Court does not seem reluctant to refer to for-
eign law or international understandings (for example, the Commentary
to the OECD Model Tax Treaty) when seeking to determine results in
particular situations involving the application of U.S. tax treaty concepts.
More generally, however, reliance on foreign law seems to have become a
highly volatile issue in the United States and, consequently, litigants,
planners, and particularly judges should take note of these developments
outside the tax context. For example, during the 109th Congress, the
58. 104 T.C. 535 (1995), acq. 1995-2 C.B. 1.
59. Id. at 549-50.
60. Id. at 556. This was a proceeding involving the application to a German insurance
agent of the "independent agent" provision of the Germany-Netherlands Treaty.




Constitution Restoration Act was introduced by Rep. Aderholt (R-Ala.)
and Sen. Shelby (R-Ala.). 63 This legislation would provide the following:
In interpreting and applying the Constitution of the United States, a
court of the United States may not rely upon any constitution, law,
administrative rule, Executive order, directive, policy, judicial deci-
sion, or any other action of any foreign state or international organi-
zation or agency, other than English constitutional and common law
up to the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the United
States.64
Although prospects for its enactment might be limited, and even though
most tax decisions involving tax treaties do not involve "constitutional
issues" from these developments, a "chilling effect" on court opinion
writing (including in the United States Tax Court) might be observed. 65
Whether this "chilling effect" will eventually spill over more substan-
tially into the tax adjudication context in the United States is difficult to
predict. Perhaps, however, these judges in U.S. tax cases are becoming
aware of the (probably political) risks in relying on foreign (including
international organization) laws and model rules.
VII. TAX-TREATY AUTHORIZED WITHHOLDING ON
INTERCOMPANY DIVIDENDS
In addition to the many procedural elements of income tax treaties (as
discussed above), the imposition of withholding taxes on corporate divi-
dends paid continues to evolve. Under the U.S. domestic tax structure,
dividends paid to the foreign shareholder are subject to withholding at
63. H.R. 1070, 109th Cong. (2006); S. 520, 109th Cong. (2006).
64. Id. § 201. Note that in an October 28, 2003 speech, (former) Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor indicated (commenting on the Texas sodomy case, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003)) that she and her colleagues on the Supreme Court had looked to international
norms in the Lawrence case and another recent case involving the execution of the men-
tally retarded. She noted that over time "we will rely increasingly on international and
foreign law in resolving, what now appear to be domestic issues." Sandra Day O'Connor,
former Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Remarks to Southern Center
for International Studies (Oct. 28, 2003) (receiving the World Justice Award). In the No-
vember 1, 2003 issue of the Christian Coalition's weekly report, the Christian Coalition
suggested that this comment meant that Justice O'Connor would ignore the U.S. Constitu-
tion, adding that such a move "seems to be an impeachable offense." See Supreme Court
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor Aborts the U.S. Constitution: Impeachable Offense?, BNA
DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVEs, Nov. 4, 2003, at A17. What does this imply for (lower level)
U.S. judges in U.S. tax cases who have the audacity to rely on the OECD Commentary?
Perhaps tax cases will be "under the radar" on this issue.
65. Similarly, on January 13, 2005, at a forum at American University Law School,
U.S. Supreme Court Justices Scalia and Breyer debated this precise issue. See Stephen
Breyer, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, and Antonin Scalia, Assoc.
Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Foreign Courts and U.S. Constitutional Law,
Debate of American University Law School (Jan. 13, 2005). Justice Breyer stated that
reference to foreign law was appropriate, noting "I may learn something" and "[f]oreign
law doesn't determine the result, but it shows what other people have done." Id. But,
Justice Scalia indicated that it is "arrogant" to rely on foreign law to determine issues in the
United States, noting that "if we don't want [foreign law] to be authoritative, then what is




source on the gross amount at the rate of thirty percent. 66 The rate of
this withholding is ordinarily reduced under an applicable tax treaty: The
U.S. Model Treaty suggests that withholding at source should be imposed
at the rate of fifteen percent, but at the reduced rate of five percent of the
gross amount of the dividends if the beneficial owner of the dividends
being received is a company that owns directly at least ten percent of the
voting stock of the company paying the dividends. 67 The OECD Model
Treaty is the same except for the percentage of ownership required to
obtain the reduced five percent withholding rate.68
Starting in 2001 with the renegotiation of the U.K.-U.S. income tax
treaty, some U.S. income tax treaties have been adopted to significantly
modify this position so that the withholding tax on intercompany divi-
dends (under the conditions specified in each treaty) is eliminated, with
all the taxation assumed therefore to be imposed at residence. This has
occurred in the following treaties between the United States and the fol-
lowing countries: (a) The United Kingdom; 69 (b) Australia;70 (c) Mex-
66. Under the statutory approach that withholding is at the rate of thirty percent of
the gross payment. I.R.C. §§ 871(a)(1), 881(a)(1) (West 2006).
67. Model Treaty, supra note 29, art. 10(2).
68. OECD Model Treaty, supra note 40, art. 10(2). The five percent rate would be
available if the beneficial owner of the dividends is a company other than a partnership
which holds directly at least twenty-five percent of the capital of the company paying the
dividends. OECD Model Treaty Comment 10 to Article 10 provides that if a company of
one of the States directly owns a holding of at least twenty-five percent in a company of the
other State, it is reasonable that payments of profits by the subsidiary to the foreign parent
company should be taxed less heavily to avoid recurrent taxation and to facilitate interna-
tional investment. Id. cmt. 10. Comment 13 to Article 10 specifies that the tax rates fixed
by the Article for the tax in the State of source are maximum rates. Id. cmt. 13. The States
may agree, in bilateral negotiations, on lower rates or even on taxation exclusively in the
State of the beneficiary's residence. As noted in the text, this advice has been imple-
mented by the United States in various recent treaties (limited as to an increased percent-
age of ownership).
69. A revised U.K.-U.S. income tax treaty was signed on July 24, 2001 and entered
into force on March 31, 2003. See J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., EXPLANATION
OF PROPOSED INCOME TAX TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE
UNITED KINGDOM (Comm. Print 2003) (including a description of a related U.K.-U.S. pro-
tocol signed July 22, 2002); DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE
CONVENTION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION
WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL GAIN (2006).
70. A protocol to the Australia-U.S. income tax treaty entered into force on May 12,
2003. See generally Protocol Amending the Convention Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of Australia for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-
Austl., Sept. 27, 2001, S. TREATY Doc. No. 107-20. This protocol also provides for a zero-
rate withholding tax on certain intercompany dividends and for the elimination of source
country withholding taxes on several important types of interest, particularly interest de-
rived by a financial institution (if dealing independently with the payor, in other words, is
not related) and interest paid to governmental entities. Id. § 6, para. 3, § 7, para. 3. How-
ever, other types of interest (including interest received by financial institutions in back-to-
back loans or their economic equivalent) continue to be subject to source-country with-
holding tax at the maximum rate of ten percent. Id. § 7, para. 4. See, generally, Linda L.
Ng, Asia-Pacific Tax Review: Australia-U.S. Treaty Protocol an Example of New U.S. Treaty
"Gold Standard," 31 TAX NOTES INT'L 869, 887 (2003).
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ico;71 (d) Japan;72 (e) The Netherlands; 73 and (f) Sweden.7 1
71. A protocol to the Mexico-U.S. income tax treaty was signed on November 26, 2002
and entered into force on July 3, 2003. See, generally, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNI-
CAL EXPLANATION OF THE PROTOCOL BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES (2003).
This also contained zero dividend withholding tax provisions. U.S. Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, Senate Panel Releases Report on Proposed Mexico-U.S. Protocol, TAX
NOTES TODAY, Mar. 20, 2003, LEXIS 2003 TNT 55-17. This revision further provides
Mexico with tax treaty treatment equivalent to the best treatment negotiated by the United
States with any other tax treaty partner (that is, a "most favored nation" clause). Id. at 23.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted its displeasure with such a provision, indi-
cating the following: "The Committee notes its continuing concern regarding the effect of
such provisions [the self-executing MFN provision] and expects that the Treasury Depart-
ment will not include such provision in future treaties." Id. at 27.
72. This treaty, initialed during June 2003, was signed on November 6, 2003. Protocol
for the Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Japan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Japan, Nov. 6, 2003 S. TREATY Doc. No.
108-14 [hereinafter 2003 U.S.-Japan Treaty]. See also BNA DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES,
supra note 65, at L5. This treaty constitutes a modernization of the 1971 Japan-U.S. in-
come tax treaty, one of the oldest U.S. income tax treaties. This treaty accomplishes signif-
icant reduction in cross-border withholding taxes; all source-country withholding tax on
royalty income is eliminated, an item particularly significant because of the large inflow of
royalties into the United States from Japan; the treaty eliminates withholding tax on inter-
est earned by financial institutions and reduces presently higher withholding rates to lower
rates of the preferred U.S. model. Also eliminated is the withholding tax on dividend
payments to a controlling parent corporation. The withholding tax is eliminated on divi-
dends paid by a U.S. subsidiary to the Japanese parent company that owns more than a
fifty-percent interest and, similarly in the reverse situation, if the parent company owns a
fifty-percent interest or less in a subsidiary, the dividends would remain subject to with-
holding under the revised treaty. See generally U.S.-Japan Treaty, supra. Of course, in
situations like this, planning devices (such as minimal preferred shares) will probably be
implemented to enable surpassing the fifty percent hurdle imposed by this provision.
73. See Protocol Amending the Convention Between the United States of America
and the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Pre-
vention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Neth., art. III March 8,
2004, S. TREATY DOC. No. 108-25 (amending Article 10 of the treaty to provide for no
withholding on dividends from an eighty percent or greater owned subsidiary). See also
STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED PROTOCOL TO THE
INCOME TAX TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE NETHERLANDS, JCX-54-04
(2004).
74. Protocol Amending the Convention Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of Sweden for the Avoidance of Double Taxation
and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Sept. 30, 2005, S.
TREATY DOC. No. 109-8 art. IV (providing for a complete replacement of Article 10, the
current dividends article); see also Protocol to Sweden-United States Income Tax Conven-
tion, Signed September 30, 2005, TAX NOTES TODAY, LEXIS, 2005 TNT 191-24. See also
Brown Testimony, supra note 13, at 6 (indicating that the provision dealing with inter-
company dividends was very important to Sweden because it had unilaterally eliminated its
withholding tax on inter-company dividends):
The legislative history to that domestic law change makes it clear that the
main beneficiaries of that change were expected to be U.S. companies. In
fact, it refers specifically to assurances given to the Swedish negotiators that
the United States would not agree to eliminate the withholding tax on inter-
company dividends in any bilateral agreement with any country. Now that
U.S. policy has changed, failure to provide a reciprocal benefit for Swedish
companies would have jeopardized the exemption from Swedish withholding
tax that currently benefits U.S. companies. We believe that securing that
protection, as well as eliminating the withholding tax on dividends paid to
pension funds, is a sufficient quid pro quo.
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In 2006 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the
U.S. Treasury stated that the decision to eliminate the source country
withholding on intercompany dividends "is made independently with re-
spect to every treaty negotiation. '75 The indication from Treasury is that,
upon the adoption of the U.S. Treasury position to possibly eliminate the
source country withholding tax on intercompany dividends, "a number of
treaty relationships that had been at best stagnant and at worst problem-
atic have changed for the better. '76 A further observation made was that
bilateral tax treaty relationships between other countries (that is, non-
U.S. relationships) have resulted in similar exemptions on intercompany
dividends, and that this could be beneficial upon the transfer of profits
from one foreign country subsidiary upstream to another foreign country
subsidiary, where both of these countries have implemented withholding
exemptions under their treaty.77
As evidence that this intercompany dividend exemption has not been
adopted as an absolute policy, one can observe the Bangladesh-U.S. in-
come tax treaty also subject to review at the February 2006 hearings. 78
This proposed U.S. income tax treaty was signed in September 2004 and
provides for a maximum source country withholding tax rate on divi-
dends of fifteen percent and a ten percent rate applicable to direct invest-
ment dividends. 79 Similar to the Model Treaty, this treaty requires a ten
percent ownership threshold for the application of the ten percent with-
holding tax rate. 80 An explanation for not including a zero intercompany
Id.
75. Brown Testimony, supra note 13, at 5. The statement is made that "[t]he United
States will agree to the provision only if the agreement includes limitation on benefits and
information exchange provisions that meet the highest standards, and if the overall balance
of the agreement is appropriate." Id. Earlier, when reviewing the Mexico-U.S. Income
Tax Treaty, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted with approval the Department
of Treasury's statement that "[iun light of the range of facts that should be considered, the
Treasury Department does not view [the elimination of the withholding tax on inter-com-
pany dividends] as a blanket change in the United States' tax treaty practice." See U.S.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Panel Releases Report on Proposed Mexico-
U.S. Protocol, TAX NOTES TODAY, March 20, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 55-17.
76. Brown Testimony, supra note 13, at 5, specifying that this changed policy has ena-
bled the Treasury to achieve the following objectives: (a) strengthen treaty shopping provi-
sions, including the introduction of rules that prevent the use of tax treaties after a
corporate inversion transaction; (b) significantly improving information exchange provi-
sions, allowing access to information even when the treaty partner does not need the infor-
mation for its own tax purposes; (c) reducing withholding taxes on interest and royalties to
levels lower than those to which the treaty partners had previously agreed; (d) eliminating
withholding taxes on dividends paid to pension funds (thereby eliminating eventual double
taxation); and (e) protecting U.S. companies against the retaliatory re-imposition of with-
holding taxes on inter-company dividends.
77. Id.
78. See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE CONVENTION
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERN-
MENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE
TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON IN-
COME. See also Treasury Department Releases Technical Explanation of Bangladesh-U.S.
Income Tax Treaty, TAX NOTES TODAY Feb. 2, 2006, LEXIS, 2006 TNT 23-21.




dividends rate is that this is a treaty with a developing country.81 Future
tax treaties with developing countries will presumably implement a simi-
lar approach. The objective, one must assume, is that the dividend flows
are predominantly sourced from the developing country and, therefore,
the economic objective of maintaining a withholding tax would be to en-
able the source (developing) country to capture some of that tax benefit,
even though profits taxes on the distributed dividend may have previ-
ously been imposed on the distributing corporation (perhaps at a level
even higher than the thirty-five percent U.S. maximum corporate tax
rate).
VIII. EXPLOITATION OF GAPS IN BILATERAL INCOME
TAX TREATIES
A. DOUBLE NON-TAXATION
The bilateral income tax treaty may enable reference to local law for
making certain determinations concerning treaty applicability. Alterna-
tively, a void may exist, and each party can interpret the provisions in a
manner not inconsistent with the treaty provisions. This can present
anomalous situations, including (1) potential double taxation and (2) po-
tential zero taxation.
If potential economic double taxation does arise, the taxpayer (often
multiple taxpayers, for example, parent and subsidiary corporations) can
often obtain relief under the Competent Authority provisions of the ap-
plicable bilateral tax treaty. Tax treaties do not ordinarily explicitly pre-
clude economic double taxation. The article providing for profits
adjustments between related entities will often require a mutual adjust-
ment, however.8 2 Article 23 of the Model Treaty specifically provides for
relief from double taxation and ordinarily indicates that a tax credit shall
be allowed so as to avoid double taxation occurring.8 3 If necessary, the
parties might seek assistance from the "competent authorities" of each
taxing authority so as to eliminate or reduce the impact of potential eco-
nomic double taxation. 84
81. Id.
82. See Model Treaty, supra note 29, art. 9(1) (providing for the appropriate allocation
of profits between related entities), but see id. art. 9(2) (specifying that the competent
authorities shall consult to avoid double taxation in these contexts).
83. Id. art. 23.
84. For example, the U.S. Model Treaty, Article 25(1), entitled "Mutual Agreement
Procedure", specifies the following:
Where a person considers that the actions of one or both of the Contracting
States result or will result for him in taxation not in accordance with the
provisions of this Convention, he may, irrespective of the remedies provided
by the domestic law of those States, and the time limits prescribed in such
laws for presenting claims for refund, present his case to the competent au-
thority of either Contracting State.
Id. art. 25(1). Further, the Technical Explanation specifies that this article provides the
mechanism for taxpayers to bring to the attention of competent authorities those issues
and problems that may arise under the Convention. TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra
note 34, at 117. It also provides a mechanism for cooperation between the competent
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From the taxpayer's (and tax planner's) perspective, the objective, of
course, is (1) to not only avoid economic double taxation but also (2) to
achieve "double non-taxation. '8 5 This means incurring no tax on the in-
come derived from a particular cross-border transaction, achieved
through exploiting gaps between the tax structures in the two countries
which are the parties to the tax treaty.8 6 Thus, in some situations no tax is
actually imposed on certain types of income by either the source country
or the residence country. For investors coming into the United States this
can be possibly achieved when the foreign investor importing the capital
into the United States operates through a reverse hybrid structure (that
is, a corporation in the United States and a passthrough in the country of
residence). For government tax policy specialists, the inquiry must be
whether "double non-taxation" should be indirectly authorized through
gaps in an income tax treaty.
This is an issue that will percolate for a considerable period because
taxpayers have become particularly sophisticated in achieving double
non-taxation, often through gaps in entity-characterization rule differ-
ences between treaty partner countries. Many treaties (including, partic-
ularly, U.S. income tax treaties) do not directly address this issue. To
prevent U.S. income tax avoidance, I.R.C. § 894(c) was enacted to limit a
taxpayer's right to a reduced withholding rate under a tax treaty in cer-
tain situations involving fiscally transparent entities.8 7 The issue of
whether actual taxation should be a prerequisite to obtaining treaty relief
is a subject which is now beginning to mature. Treaty policy deliberations
must address how to confront this important issue.88
B. THE LIMITATION ON BENEFITS
For several decades the Treasury has been pursuing the inclusion of a
"limitation on benefits" provision in new and renegotiated tax treaties.
The objective of the Treasury in this context is to not enter into or main-
tain in existence an income tax treaty which, practically, can be trans-
formed through adroit tax planning, into a "treaty with the world." The
authorities of the Contracting States to resolve disputes and clarify issues that may arise
under the Convention and to resolve cases of double taxation not provided for in the Con-
vention. Id. In addition, the Article authorizes the competent authorities to consult so as
to deny the benefit of the Convention where affording such a benefit would lead to the
avoidance of tax in a manner inconsistent with the Convention. Id. at 122.
85. The subject of "Double Non-Taxation" was examined at the 2004 Vienna Congress
of the International Fiscal Association. See generally INT'L FISCAL Ass'N, DOUBLE NON-
TAXATION subject 1 (2004).
86. See Lee Sheppard, U.S.-Sponsored Double Nontaxation, 110 TAX NOTES 196
(2006) (examining the premise that many of the tax treaties based on the OECD model
income tax treaty have become vehicles for enabling double nontaxation).
87. Note that, although debatable, the legislative history for this provision specifies
that this statutory limitation is an interpretation and clarification of the availability of
treaty benefits and not a limitation on previously existing treaties. See STAFF OF THE J.
COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION EN-
ACTED IN 1997, at 251 (Comm. Print 1997).
88. For a discussion of this issue from the U.S. perspective, see Diane Ring, United
States Report, 725 in INT'L FISCAL Ass'N, supra note 85, at 725.
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tax planner's objective sought to be achieved would be to enable use of
an entity in the treaty partner country, which, however, facilitates conduit
tax treatment in that country. The important objective of income tax
treaty provisions reducing source country taxation is to cause a shifting of
a taxpayer's tax burden to the residence state, but only if the beneficiary
is actually a tax resident of the other state. "Those reductions and bene-
fits are not intended to flow to residents of a third country."89 For exam-
ple, if (a) a resident (including a corporation) in a Middle Eastern or
South American country not having an income tax treaty with the United
States could organize a controlled entity in a third jurisdiction (such as
The Netherlands), (b) that Netherlands entity would have the benefits of
the U.S. income tax treaty upon the receipt of profits from U.S. corporate
investments, and (c) under the applicable internal Dutch tax law (that is,
the "participation exemption" provisions) the taxation on that income in
The Netherlands could be eliminated or significantly moderated, the pro-
visions of this tax treaty would be frustrated. Every new U.S. income tax
treaty (particularly every revision of previously existing U.S. income tax
treaties with large trading partner countries) produces a strengthening of
the limitations imposed in this context. The nuances in this context are
many, with the variables depending upon business investment conditions
and tax structures in the treaty partner country. The objective of the
Treasury is quite clear, and the continuing evolution of the Treasury's
perspective in this context is quite interesting to examine.
IX. DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER INCOME TAX TREATIES
Because of national pride (or unilaterist perspectives), the United
States (under the watchful eye of the U.S. Senate) has been quite careful
about agreeing that disputes over appropriate taxing jurisdiction between
the United States and a foreign country be referred to binding, indepen-
dent arbitration.90 Several U.S. tax treaties do include provisions con-
cerning utilizing binding arbitration to resolve tax treaty disputes where
the competent authorities have been unsuccessful in their efforts. 91 Ex-
89. Brown Testimony, supra note 13, at 4.
90. See William W. Park, Income Tax Treaty Arbitration, 31 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 219
(2002).
91. See, e.g., Convention Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capi-
tal and Certain Other Taxes, U.S.-F.R.G., art. 25, Aug. 29, 1989, RIA International Tax
Treaty 1400, introducing an arbitration procedure not found in other U.S. income tax trea-
ties. It provides that where the competent authorities have been unable to resolve a disa-
greement regarding the application or interpretation of the Convention, the disagreement
may, by mutual consent of the competent authorities, be submitted for arbitration. Noth-
ing in the provision requires that any case be submitted for arbitration. Detailed rules are
provided for implementation of the arbitration procedure. See also Convention Between
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Mexi-
can States for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Mex., art. 26, para. 5, Sept. 18, 1992, STATE DEP'T 1993
WL 841568, specifying the potential for an arbitration procedure. The competent authori-
ties are to consult after this treaty has been in force for three years to decide whether it is
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treme reluctance exists on the U.S. side to make the leap of faith that the
arbitrators actually will be independent (particularly tempered by the
perspective of many U.S. politicians that tax controversy adjudication
concerning U.S. taxation cannot be delegated to an international body).
This perspective is somewhat myopic since another nation-state is also
involved in these controversies over the appropriate exercise of tax juris-
diction. Gradually, cross-border tax dispute resolution is occurring
among other countries, and eventually these "alternative dispute resolu-
tion" mechanisms must be seriously recognized by the United States.
This will particularly be the situation forced on the United States if it
must deal with tax controversies in a multilateral context, for example, in
a North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") environment
where both Mexico and Canada are also involved, or in arrangements
with the European Union ("EU") where many of the EU Member States
jointly have positions concerning the exercise of taxing rights antagonistic
to the perspective of the Treasury.
X. CONSIDERING THE FUTURE
The speed of progress for the expansion and improvement of the U.S.
income tax treaty regime structure has increased significantly during 2005
and early 2006, and that expansion can reasonably be anticipated to con-
tinue during late 2006.92 The challenge to the U.S. tax treaty negotiators
is not only to respond expeditiously to current, significant issues arising
under existing U.S. income tax treaties with major trading partners. A
further obligation will be to expeditiously confront some of the funda-
mental challenges presented to tax treaty policies if substantial revision of
the business tax structure should occur in the United States.
Consequently, a large imponderable in this process is the potential im-
pact on the entire U.S. income tax structure if significant corporate-share-
holder taxation revision were to be adopted or if other substantial
changes were to be implemented. For example, in the Joint Committee
on Taxation's 2005 Option Paper, a proposal is included to amend the
rules for determining corporate residency.93 Under this proposal, a pub-
licly traded foreign incorporate entity would be treated as a resident in
the United States if it is managed and controlled in the United States.94
This would be similar to the "substantial presence" test included in the
appropriate to exchange the notes to proceed with an arbitration arrangement. One of the
key factors for the U.S. Competent Authority in making that decision was to be the U.S.
experience under the arbitration provision of the U.S.-Germany treaty. A similar volun-
tary arbitration procedure was implemented under the Canada-U.S. income tax treaty and
various other subsequently effective treaties.
92. See generally Robert Goulder, Treasury Official Spots Trends in Treaty Practice,
109 TAX NOTES 1221 (2005).
93. See STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLI-




2004 protocol to the Netherlands-U.S. Income Tax Treaty. 95 In many in-
stances this would necessitate a revision of U.S. income tax treaties. 96
This proposal concerning corporate residence is reaffirmed in the Report
of the President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform. 97 This propo-
sal, as enunciated in the report of the President's Advisory Panel, would
also appear to necessitate revision of that article in U.S. income tax trea-
ties defining corporate residence.
Similarly, multiple proposals were made during 2005 in these several
studies to adopt a dividend exemption system for the taxation to U.S.
taxpayers of foreign business income.98 Changes made to implement
these changes could likewise necessitate quite significant revisions of all
the treaties in the U.S. income tax treaty network.99
All these developments evidence that the impact of income tax treaties
on cross border transactions is becoming even more complicated. Tradi-
tionally, the resolution of disputes involving treaty issues appeared easier
than resolving interpretations of complicated provisions of the I.R.C.
Even though the language in an applicable U.S. income tax treaty may
still seem considerably less complicated than the I.R.C. provisions, the
95. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE PROTOCOL SIGNED
AT WASHINGTON ON MARCH 8, 2004 AMENDING THE CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA AND THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF
DOUBLE TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES
ON INCOME SIGNED AT WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 18, 1992 art. 2 (2004).
96. The JCT Staff report implies that this may not be necessary, noting on page 181
that the JCT Staff proposal concerning corporate situs "does not adopt all aspects of the
substantial presence test used in the Dutch protocol because some aspects lack relevance
outside the treaty context." STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE
TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES, JCS-02-5, at 178 (2005).
97. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-
GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM (2005). In describing the proposed
"Simplified Income Tax Plan," the report notes that the current law residency test is based
on the place a business entity is organized. Id. at 135. This rule makes an artificial distinc-
tion that allows certain foreign entities to avoid U.S. taxation even though they are eco-
nomically similar to entities organized in the United States. This rule may give businesses
an incentive to establish a legal place or residency outside the United States to avoid pay-
ing tax on some foreign income. The report notes that several large companies have used a
similar technique to avoid taxes under our current system. Id. The report states that re-
cently enacted legislation created rules to prevent existing corporations from moving off-
shore but does not prevent newly organized entities from taking advantage of the rules. Id.
Consequently, to prevent this tax-motivated ploy, the Simplified Income Tax Plan would
provide a comprehensive rule that treats a business as a resident of the United States (and
subject to U.S. tax) if the United States is the business's place of legal residency or if the
United States is the businesses's place of "primary management and control." Id. The
report indicated that this new two-pronged residency test would ensure that businesses
whose day-to-day operations are managed in the United States cannot avoid taxes simply
by receiving mail and holding a few board meetings each year "at an island resort." Id.
98. See STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLI-
ANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES, JCS-02-05, at 186 (2005).
99. See id. at 192, which specifies that the proposed revised system of territorial taxa-
tion on business income would require the renegotiation of existing income tax treaties,
which are premised on the assumption that the United States will continue to operate a
worldwide tax system. "For example, existing treaties generally require the United States
to allow foreign tax credits for foreign corporation income taxes and dividend withholding
taxes under certain circumstances." Id. at 192-93. "These treaties would have to be revised
to reflect the conversion from a credit mechanism to an exemption mechanism." Id. at 193.
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potential gaps being exploited in treaty tax planning will continue to pre-
sent ever increasing challenges. Further, many changing business prac-
tices (as evidenced, for example, by the impact of the digital economy)
will present important challenges in this context.
XI. MY PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT DEAN GALVIN
On a personal note, I very much appreciate the invitation to participate
in honoring Charley Galvin by providing this article to this Symposium
issue of the SMU Law Review. Dean Galvin was my first Dean as a law
professor. I very well remember when we first met-when he came to
interview me when I was the Deputy General Counsel at the Export-
Import Bank of the United States. I believe he was intrigued by the ex-
perience that I earlier had across the street in Washington, D.C. working
on tax legislative matters at the Treasury. He took a risk when inviting
me to teach federal taxation courses at the SMU School of Law in the Fall
Semester, 1973 (perhaps even extending a temporary teaching commit-
ment to me without fully informing his faculty). That is when my tax law
teaching career began-with his support as Dean and his example as a
leading tax scholar.
Charley was then among a limited group of the premier U.S. tax law
academics, and he provided an on-site example about how to function as
a tax academic when probing various facets of appropriate tax policy. At
some point I became aware that he may have earlier encountered conflict
and criticism by examining some of the fundamental premises for provid-
ing certain (perhaps excessive) energy industry tax benefits. His analysis
and thoughtful position in this context was eventually validated with ra-
tional statutory changes, but I saw how he set an example in taking the
"high road" of tax policy analysis, despite external criticisms (including
those of some law school potential donors). In retrospect, that perspec-
tive was really quite refreshing, particularly in contrast to some of the
contemporary thrust of tax policy analysis primarily to achieve legislative
advocacy purposes.
Charley's positive influence on me and my tax academic career cannot
be exaggerated. He began as a very considerate mentor. He continued
and has always been thoughtful and supportive of my academic progress.
And he has been a consistent friend. Thank you Charley!
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